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SEPTEMBER
15, rgr7,* the CeotraI Committee of the
Bolshevik Party, the headquarters of which were'then
in Petrograd, received two letters from Lenin through the
usual secret channels. The leader of the RevoIutim, who had
been obliged to go into hiding, insisted that the Bolsheviks
take state power into their own hands.
What were the circumstances that gave rise to this demand?
What c h g e s in class relationships impelled the Bolsheviks
to raise the question of capturing power at that particular
M

The Kordov revolt in August, 1917, had k e n suppressed,
and General Kornilov himself with his conf&&erals

.

But General Alexeyev, who had been a party to the K o d o v
plot, had been appointed Chief of StafE of General I3-d..
quarters. As for the pmceedings against KorPiIov himself,
they were being conducted in such a marmer that the Genemi
. a m e d as amuser rather than accused. He was given free
to all secret documents, and *ugh
the medium of
proxies was able to publish whatever he found necessary about
the trial, His "jail" was the building of the Girls' School in
Bykhov, and his guard the Tekinsky Regiment, which had bub
recently been his petsonat bodjguard.
Under such a "prison" regime and with so "watchful" a
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guard, KornilwI who had the advantage of being freed from
the &cult and arduous task of commanding an army, could
analyze his defeat at 1eisltl.e and elaborate new plans, Dispatch
riders were constantly scurryiag between Bykhov and GeneraI
Headquarters of the Russian m y ; officers visited KorniIov
f d y , supplying him with important information and news.
Iduentid bankers and represenbtives of foreign powers visited
him in "jail!' All this afforded Kornilov the opportuni~of
elaborating a new plan of attack on the revoIution-the second
Kornilov plot. This time Komilov and the counter-revolutionary
forces that were back of him endeavored to concoct a mu&
more thorough-going plan of action involving incomparably
greater forces. In August it had been planned to throw a
mere corps of from 15,to 2 0 , men
~
against Petrograd.
Now a11 plans were based on hundreds of thousands, to include,
in the Erst place, the Shock Battalions, consisting of approximately 5 0 , picked
~
men recommended by their officers, the
Juafrer Schools, the OEcersJ Training Schmls and the senior
grades of the Cadet Corps, numbering from 4 5 , p . t o 50,000
excellently equipped men, and the cavalry divisions, mainly
Cossack units. In addition particular attention was accorded
the Gechoslovak Corps, which the tsarist government had
begun to form, but which had actually been fully orgadzed
under the Provisional Govermmmt. By October this Grps
n m h r e d over 30,men trained on the French model and
commanded by picked officers. The Corps was disposed on the
right bank of the Dnieper, so that it c d d easily occupy all
the railroad junctions and cut off the southwestern front from
Petrograd and Moscow, which were preparing to rise.
Besides these forces, there was the Polish Corps, under
General Dowber-Musnicki, This corps was made up of Poles
who had seen regular service in the old army and had been

6
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recommended by two Potih ofiicers. Tbcre were three times
as many officers in it as in any regular army corps. It is not
difficult to understand what side the P o l i Corps was on under
these &cumskwms. The Corps was stationed in Byelorussia
In the event of aa uprisig in Petrograd, it could quickly cut
off the western front and hold up any troop trains that attempted to go to the assistance of the insurgent workers,

THE SECOND KORNILOV PLOT
The instigators of the second Kornilov plot could thus count
on from ooo,ooo to 250,000 men. With the existence of an
army at l a s t ten million strong, a quarter of a d i m would
on the surface of it not appear to be of decisive account. But
by that time the army was no longer an &dent fighting force.
Two hundred thousand soldiers massed in a single driving
force could compel wavering regiments to act on its side. It
was on this that Kornilov w a s b k b g . Such were the plans
of the cwnter-revolutionaries,
The historians who endeavored to reconstruct the picture
of the second KomiIov plot were faced with a &cult task,
for no documents on the second Kornilov plot were to be
found in any of the archives. No records whatever existed.
Those who had participated in the plot had left practically no
w.It was necessary to proceed in a roundabout and fairly
tortuous way that promised much labor and no few disappointments.
First of dl they set about studyhg the daily orders that had
been issued by the General Staff during the months of September and October 1917. At first glance it seemed an almost
hopeless a s k to find the necessary clue in the tedious batch of
marching orders issued to the various units. But one particular
circumstance struck the investigators. In the latter part of Sep7

t e m k , Cossack regiments and occasionally entire divisions had
begun to be withdrawn horn the front and transferred to the
rear. The official reason for this movement w a s everywhere the
same frequently repeated statement: "Shortage of fodder at
the front.''

But when further investigation revealed where the Cossack
u n i t s were being dispatched, it became dear that it was not
at all a matter of fodder. Two divisions had been sent to Finh d , one division to the Donbas and one to Bryansk. There was
not wen a hint of fodder in these districts. The fact was that
from Finland it was possible to reach Petrograd in forty-eight
hours, while from Bryansk and the Donbas it was possible to
move on the North and -cut off the road connecting Moscow
with the Ukraine and the southwestern front.

The disposition of the cavalry contingents dearly disclosed
the reason for tlleir movements: the cavalry was being put in
readiness to fight against the revolution.
In this way the due was discovered, differing from the mythiEal due of Ariadne's in that instead of leading frem the labyrinth it was a guide to its very depths. A closer study was made
of the movements of the regiments and the nature of the newly
formed units. The s o - d e d Shock Battalions were examined
more thoroughly. This was the name given to the battalions
of Cavaliers of the Cross of St,George, of kulaks' sons,undergraduates, etc., formed in ~ g7.
r Agah according to the OW
version these battalions had been organized to assist the regular
=my, witb a view to reenforcing the regiments that showed
a disindinatim to fight, and thus welding the disintegrating
army together.
Nevertheless, despite the official declarations, the Shoclc BatUrn had not been dispatched to the front where they were
needed, but strangely enough had been m o v d closer to Petro8

ening Catastrophe and How to Fight It," "The Crisis Has
Matured," "Willthe Bolsheviks Rebin State Power?; * letters
on the uprising, and numerous additional documents of emrmous international import.
In bis brilIiant articles, written so simply that every worker
could comprehend them, Lenin laid bare the most intriate
weavings of the bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press, tore the mask from the faces of the Kornilwite
Scihlists--=ensky
and Co.-mercilessly castigated the traitors to the revolution, eiiticized the slightest manifestation a£
vacillation in the ranks of the Bolsheviks and at every stage
of fie revolution pointed out the path and methods of struggle
for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
b i n providentially saw that the bourgeoisie was adopting
a new form of struggIe, that it was making preparations for
a avil war against the w o r k s and peasants.
Civil war is the high& form of class struggle. In it all
the inherent antagonisms of the class struggle become more
acute and the class struggle develops into an armed conflict.
Civil war is the acutest form of class struggle; ill society is
divided into two hostile mmps, and the question of power is
decided by force of arms.
Continuing and further developing Marx's doctrine, Lenin
mote as follows about the essence of civil war:

..

. ..

. experience
shows us that civil war is the sharpest
form of the class struggle; it is that point ia the class struggle
when dashes and battles, economic and politid, repeating
& m d v e s , growing, broadening, becoming acute, turn into an
armed struggle of one class against another class." (V. I.
k i n , CoUected Works, Vol. XXI,p. 231).
Id

* Cf. V. I. k i n , CoUbttd Workr, Vol. XXI, International Publisbuq
New York All references unless otherwise stated are from
lihed by International PnbSiers, New Ymk-Ed.
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, ~ w a s ~ c d b y t h c * d b g w i P t b e f ~ ~ f
8trqggit of all h
s of Ehe ppakhL
F i t of all, the prohrht's strike form of stniggle tu&rwent a ndid change. Evm before the K a d o v
the
I
ptofeat+t, under the Idemhip of the &ldm& Party, had
mgaged in strikes that had constantly assumed larger dimen&Is* h o m i c S
t
f
k
ie
s
w gmwll into politid strikes, bc#lmitrg in&rwoveu with the latter and displaying an unmemhg
teaden9 to spmd, &cumulating, as it w&e, the forms fox a
decisive blow. But after the comber-revolutiotlary Kmnilm
revolt was suppressed a new fature -a
in the
.
class strikes, aa ihstmted by the folio*: the workem of
the R&&-Sde
Warkg in aharkuv decked a strike*
out the plant mamgemat and took over the m d n g of t
k
plant themaetves, Ln a n u m k of leather works in M o m +he
workers removed their managem, ~~,m,,
and elected mike
c o m m b which were entrusted with keeping production p
,kg, The new fmture in the strike nmvanenk waa that the
proletariatnot d y went an strike, but drove out the =pi&,'
tookoverthcfactmiesaud~nthem~w.
Today upon Iooking over the d o u s documents dating to
the year 1917on the quation d the labor
one
flrpd thousands of facts bearing out thi~state of afhh. M,
of course, had no w& referam dontmeuts. He knew only of
bkted instal- w w l had swnebow fwad their way
the press. But on the basis af these facts the great d u t h q
leader arrived at the g m c d conclusion that the strikes of the
works had d r e arrived at the &qge of
and
&at the proletarian straggle was d r d p f a d with the question of pamr*
'

~~

-

*

~~
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bmating,'ttc., apart from the wrecking of -m, and it is
once apparent that while the peaaefd forms of strag&
W from February to August, from September they
decreased with an accompanying increase in the violent form:
seizure of estates, W n g of mmrs, and division of farm
impIements and livest&. At present we are in pssessiun of
numerous s t a t i s t i d compilations and documents which m&m
thh change in the form of the peasant struggle. Here again
i~ shown the brilliant penetration of I d n , who without all
this data which we now have, was able to arrive at the condueim that the peasant movement had evolved into a peasid
jnsudon.
An acute change in the nature of the movement for national
emahap~tionalso took place. Beginning with February this
movement had been beaded by the bourgeois nationalists, who
for a short time had succeeded in duping and oc4mally even
directly forcing a definite part of the masses to follow their
lead.
After the suppression of the Kornilw revolt the nature of
this mmrmt changed most decidedly. The -king
ppie
of the oppressed nations tried to extend a hand to the paants
and workers of Russia over the beads of their "leaders," so
that together they could march against the Provisionat &emment. The masses of the people began to undkstand that
the onIy way they could destroy the old tsarist "prison of
nations" was under the leadership of the Bolsheviks.
h September, 1917, a spontaneous movement flared up in
Tashkent. The repmm&tives of the Provisional Governeat
fled. For a time the warking people were masters of the ci
This &a not mean t h t Soviet power was vidorious in
kent before *grad.
Such an assertion would ix incorrect
if d y for the fact that the movement in Tashkmt was not

gf
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in the hands of the Bolsheviks. What, then, did the Tashkent
'events indi&e? They indicated that all the contiadktions had
become intensely aggravatd, f i d y reareaching a d i in those
place6 where they were m o s t rife-in the national and colonia5
districts. It is of interest to note that on the em of the February Revolution, too, it was in k t i a l Asia, where the contrat i k t h s were particularly acute, that they came to a head.
On the eve of the October holutioa, the events in Tashkent
indicated that the movement for national emancipation had
adopted a new form of struggle for power.
Finally, a radical changc took place in the movement in the
army, where the Bolsheviks had been arrying on an enormous
amount of work to open the eyes of the soldiers, to win them
wer to their side. In numerous regiments and divisions the
soldiem had driven wt their old officers, electing new canmanders from their own ranks and taking over command of
the units themselves. Such instances had been hewn previously
also, but they were isolated cases and did not beara mass character. After the Komilov revolt had been put down, millions
of soldiers realized that the rebellioa of the generals aimed at
the restoration of the monarchy and hence the prolongation of
the war. The soldiers were seized with horror at the thought
of the possibility of having to spend a fourth winter in the
trenches. They went over to the new form of s&1e
with a
vengeance: kicked out the Sacialist-Revolutionary and Men~hevikwindbags from their regiments, re-elected their committees, voted for the Bolsheviks, drove o;ut their officers and
in many places, in the Navy, even killed them, More than
that-the soldiers came out as agitators for a peasant uprising.
In thousands of letters sent from the front, the soldiers advised the peasants to drive out the landlords and s e i the
~
land. Behind the lines the mIdiers t h d v e s i n i W such
14

inevements. The soldiers' mwement clerrrIy manifested a tendmey to merge with the m t movement.
It wiw this change in the form of struggle that @Utd
the b d h n t dhktidan, tenin, to draw the mnclusim that
the ~ l u t crisis,
i ~bmbId at the Sxtb Congrew of the
Party i August 1917,was at h a d , making it W b l e far the
Bolsheviks to raise the question of wmthrowing the didat*
ship of the lmwgeo1de.

:
..

.
I

TOWARD SOVIET POWER

1

Between Septembr 12 and 14-unfortunately, it bas h e n
impossible to establish the e x x t date-lmin mate his letter
to the Central bnmittee of the Party in which he formulated

!
,

"Having obtained a majotity in the Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies of both ~~, the Bolsheviks cau,
and must, take over the power of government!' (V. I. LRnin,
SeLct~dWorks, Vo1. VI, p. 215.)
L m h explained why it was that insurrection s t a d on the
ooder of the day at that &cular moment:
"To Ix successfd, inswectioa must rely not upon cum@acy md not upon a *,
but upon the admeed class. That
is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon the rising revolutionary spirit of the peopte. That is the second poiat. Insurrection must rely upan the c w d mrrtasd in the history of
tht growing revolution, when the activity of the advanced
sanks of the people is at ih hdghf and when the -ow
in the mnks of the enemies and m the mRs af thu W E , hdf-(~d a d iwesofut~+&
of thr r$IFd&on ar8 strongest.
That is the third pint!' (Lminand Stalk, The R
hR m

'

zd078,
'

-

p. 191.)

These thre factors d t d .

"Wehave the following of the majority of a c h s , the vanguard of the evolution, the vanguard of the people. whicb is
capable of e n g the masses with it." (IN.,p. 172.)
The deed and famine-stricken people d e e d that only
the p l ~ cudd
t give them peace, land and bread.
"We have the foIlowing of the mujority of the people."
(1M.)

,

A hclc of faith in their forces, a lack of cohesion, codd be
felt in the camp of the closest allies of the bourgeoisie.
After the overthrow of the autocracy in February rgr 7, the
Provisional Government, with the consent of the Mensheviks
and ,%cialist-Revolutionaries, had ref rained f rum proclaiming
Russia a republic, under the pretext that the question of the
form of government, like all the other burning questions of
the revolution, was a matter to be decided by the Constituent
Assembly, the convocation of which was constantly being put
off. Immediately after the revoIt of General Kornilov, the
Sociatist-Revolutionaries md Mensheviks, under pressure of
the masses, had inclined towards the revolution, d&ding
that
Russia be declared a republic. But this shift to the Left was
extremely short-lived. Realizing that they had not succeeded
in increasing their prestige among the masses, whiIe the bourgeoisie was regarding them askance, the Socialist-Revolutimaries and Mensheviks backed up again into their old bourgeois
stalls.

II

Vacillation was also manifest in the camp of the bourgeois
party of the Gonstitutional--rats
(Cadets). The latter
were unable to obviate the antagonisms between their two
groups. The L f t s were demanding an agreement with the
Socialist-Revolutiomries and Mensheviks, while the Rights
were negotiating with he Black Hundreds. Of course, these
amta@rrisms should not be exaggerated, but, nevertheless, in
16

the &sting candidom of revolutionary d d s , these d&teri~cs
wpkmed the enemy camp.
The &ef d h of the Russian bowphde, the jmperialists
of the Entente, were dso wavering betman a war to a w d o ~ d i(1oncIusian a d a sepate p c e with German h p e d h
against R-ia
for the purpose of crushing the R
e ma-

Intion.

I

Fmch historiaus have published feiegmms that had been
kept out of the press in 1917by the censors. E v a from this
raeager i n f o d o n it is obvious that unrest I
d begun to
d h t itself among the Frenchm
p
s in the autumn of ~917.
The soldiers d a a d m i pewe. The anti-mr mommat had
seixed on whole c o y , spreading to the British d t s aa well.
Poinark has admitted in his Msmoirs that there was not a
single mrp in the Fren& Army that a d d have ken d k
p f d ~ e dto Paris for the purpose of supprdng a p s i &
uprising of the workers. Tbe imperialists were feeling the mace of m l *
ia their own muatria too.
Urged on by their bar of revoIutian, Great Briiain and
France began to send out feelers with m d to the passim
of concluding peace with Gemmy. The r q m s e on the part
of Gemmy was ad that could be desired. At the heginning
of September, a German representative approached the Fmch
Minister of Foreign M&s with a proposal to conclude peace,
agreed to concessions to France and G r a t B r i a
in the West pmided she d d d v e her share in the East.
erstwhile enemies
to inakc paa at the orpense

,
I

i.

E
1

,oiRmda.

Negotiations wete Goflducted in tbe micrest secrecy, Ail
~stk&found~wayin~thep~essweredactaredh~
dder by the respecthe grwernmms. Howmx, the e r i m s
w; eddeotly the hp?ri&$tswere chma&g tw

.

9
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much of one another. Germany then end~voredto start negotiations with Russia for a sepatate pace.
k i n knew nothing of these vtiations. But his vast
powers of penetration enabled him to predict not only the neg*
tidim between these two imperialist groups, but also the
attempt of Eumany to conclude a separate pwith Russia.
fnformatiw has recently come to light definitely confirming
Lain's briIliant insight.
In his memoirs on the revolution, written after the mdusion of the Civil War, David R. Francis, American Ambassador to Russia at that time, tells the fallowing interesting
M s : Tereshchedm, then Minister of F k c e and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, visited Archangel and dined with him
twice. He was using the assumed name of Titov. H e had
gone to Kolckk on a special mission from Gdcevich, Russian
Ambusador to Sweden. Tereshdenko assured Fmus that
he had received favorable peace terms from Getmany around
August I and that the only pwson he had shown them to was

Kerensfcy.
Behind the hcks of the peaple, the counter-revolutides,
like Nicholas Romanov on the eve of his fa,were preparing
to sell out the country only to free their hands for the strugpie against the revolution.
h n i n cuncluded his letter to the Central C d t t e e as
follows :

"AU the

objective conditions for a successful insurrection

exist. We have the exceptional advantage of a situation in which
ody our swcess in the insurrection can put an end to that most

harassing thing m earth, vacillation, which has worn the people
out ;a situation in which only our success in the insurrection
can foil the game of a separate peace directed against the
revolution by publicly proposing a fuller, juster and earlier
ptace to the b d t of #hr r m o t ~ t b t .(Itrid.,
~
p. 193.)
18

- The great I& of the revolution d c d a tbe Party to
proceed to insurrectioa As yet, Lain did not speak in his
letof the emtct date for the uprising. In his opinion, this
qwtion d d be s d c d only by d d ~ o nof those who were
ia touch with the wmkers and soldim, with the masses; in
other words, by the C m t d Cumnittee of the Party. LRnin
M s t g d that preparation of the armed uprising be on the
order of the day in all work of the Party.

PREPARATIONS FOR INSURRECTION

h d n g u p the Party to make p ~ t i m for
s armed
insufrection. Leni recommended that the Party change its
tactics, above all its attitude towards the Democratic Conference. The Iatter had been called by the Sociatist-Rwoluthdes
and Mensheviks- with a view to hoodwinking the masses, as
a counterfeit, substitute Crrnstituent Assembly.
The Bolsheviks had participated in the Democratic Conference in order to e x p e the xuadmtions of the SodalistRevolutionaries and Men&&
from its platform. But with
the adoption of the line of arrned insurrection it became impw
sible to remain in the Conference. To do so would result in
m i s l d h g the masses, would strengthen the iiru~onsabout
peaceful devdopment of the revolutim and induce the masses
to depart from the revolutionary ~ t hLenin
.
proposed leaving
the Conference after =ding a B o l s h d declaration exposing
the vile game of the comp&.

"Having read this declaration, and having appealed for decisions and not talk, for atim and not resolution-writing, we
must d;SPatch our whole fraction to the frrctosies a d the bmmcks. Their place is there ; the pulse of life is there ;the muxe
of salvation of the revolution is there; the motive force of
the Democratic Conference is there.'' (IW,
p. 195.)
19

The course that had been adopted of p d i n g to m e d
insurrection demanded that the tactics of participation in the
Conference be abandoned far the tactic of boycotting the
Conference.
This second Ietter of Lenin's to the Central Committee of
the Bdshevik Party was devoted to the questirm of preparing
for armed action, and was entitled "Marxism and Insurrection." Proceeding from the experience of the revolutions that
had taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, h i n
made a thorough and profound summary of the laws of insurrection. But he did more than sum up the experience, more
than develop and continue Marx's and Engels' teaching in the
new conditions ; he at the same time elaborated concrete directives for the organidon of the uprising in Petrograd,
He wrote :

"And in order to treat insurrection in a Marxist way, he.,
an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single
moment, organize a staff of the insurrectionary detachments ;
we must distribute our forces, we must move the-reliable regiments to the most important points; we must surround the
Alexandrinsky Theater [where the Democratic Conference was
in session.-I. M.] ; we must occupy the Peter and Paul Fortm s ; we must arrest the General Staff and the government;
we must move against the junkers and the Savage Division
such detachments as will rather die than allow the enemy to
approach the center of the city; we must mobilize the armed
workers and call upon them to engage in a last desperate fight ;
we must occupy the telepraph and telephone stations at once,
quarter mr staff of the insurrection at the central telephone
station and connect it by teIephone with alf the factories, all
the regiments, all the points of armed fighting, etc," (Ibid.)
as

I

L d n himself did

call this a plan of action, but an
illustration of what it means to treat insurrection as an art.
But anyme who is aware of the actual course of the subsquent
not

20

the

Lsnin had &id&%
carefully he had studied the requisites for
is known, Lenin's directives were carried out in fulI in th$
urse of the uprising.
Lain's letter was. discussed by the Central Committee of'
the 3olshevik Party on September 15. At tbis meeting the
traitor, Kamenev, was the only one to speak against Lenin.
The Central Committee resolutdy rebuffed the terrified
coward. Comrade Stalin proposed that the letter be printed
and sent out to the largest organizations of the Bolshevik Party,
which was done.
a can

see h m

-.

"At the end of September," S t a l i wrote on the occasioa:
f the first anniversary of the great p r o l t e revolution, ,
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to
ilize all the forces of the Party for the organization of;i
ccessful uprising." (J. V. Stalin, f
h the October Revoiw;'
don, p. 19, Russ. ed)
The entire work of the Party was directed towards the
preparation of armed action. By September 17, two days aftmi
tenm's letter was first discussed, S u n , editor of the mouthI
piece of the Bolshevik Party, was able to write in R&ocky~
Put (The Worhrd R o d ) , as the Pravda was then called :

.

a

b

''The revolution is marching on. Fired at in the July days'
and 'buried' at tbs Moscow Council, it is raising its head again, I
breaking down the old obstacles, creating a new power. The:
first line of trenches of the counter-rewlution has been mpturd. After Kmilov, Kaledin is now retreating. In the ibmes,
of the struggle the moribund Soviets are reviving. They are'
once again tacing the helm and leading the revolutionary maws.
"All p m w to the Sm*ebshnch is the slogan af the new'
movement. .
"The straight question which life raises demaads a clear

. .

and definite answer.
"For the Soviets or against them?'' (LRnia and Sari, The

Russiau Rwolufidr~,.
pp. r 96-97,)

.

1

"

'

Circumventing the censorship with consummate sW,Stdin
gave a brilliant example of mass agitation for the armed uprising in the Iegd press.
b r a d e Stah's leading articles were reprinted in the 3dshe*, papers of Moscow, Byelorussia, and the Volga region.

"...

In Russia the decisive growth of a new power is taking
place, a genuine power of the people, a genuinely revolutionary
power which is waging a desperate struggle for existence. On
the one hand there are the Soviets, standing at the head of
the revolution, at the head of the fight against the counterrevolution, which is n o t yet crushed, which has only retreated,
wisely hiding behind the back of the government. On the other
hand there is the Kerensky government, which is shielding the
ewnter-revolutionaries, is coming to an understanding with
the Kornifovites (the Cadets !), has declared war upon the
Soviets and is trying to crush them so as not to be crushed
itself.
"Who will conquer in this struggle ? That is the whole issue
now
the main thing now is not to draw up general formulas for 'saving' the revolution, but to render direct assistance
to the Soviets in their struggle against the Kerensky Government." ( L m h , Stalk, I 9 1 7, pp. 481-82.)
The Party entered upon the priod of organizing an assault.
Guided by Lenin's and Stalin's articles, the l d organizations
reorganized their work, placing the main emphasis in their
propaganda and agitation on preparations for an armed u p
rising.
The pursuance of Lenin's line in the central organ roused
the protest of Kamenev. This contemptible traitor strove to retard the mobilization of the masses. At a meeting of the Central
Committee on Septemhr 20, Kamenev protested against the
tone of the paper, which in his opinion was too sharp, and
o b j d to variaus expressions in the articles. The Central
Committee adopted a special decision on this wore:

...
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"While postponing a detailed discussim on the question of
the running of the central organ, the Central Committee m
ognizes that its general line fully ronforms with the line of
the Central Committee." ( M d e s of the Cer~tralC o w ' t t e e

of the R.SJI.LJ'., p. 69, Russ. ed.)

-
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The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party fully approved the line of the central organ, which, in Stalin's editorids,
was calmly and firmly pursuing Lenin's policy of pie*
for armed action.
Preparations for the armed uprising were conducted in the
strictest secrecy. In Petrograd StaIin summoned representatives
of the various districts to a secret meeting ia a private apartment, p e r s d y instructing them as to what units to get ready
for d o n , what buildings to occupy in the districts and how
to reorganize their agitation. From time to time, letters explaining the new course, frequently in code, were sent out to the
various regions. Use was also made of aPessengers, for the
most part members of the Central Committee.
On September 21, the Central Committee discuss@ the
tactid measures to be taken in line with the course that had
been adopted of preparing for i n s u d o n . It was -n
to decide the question of withdrawal from &e Democratic
Confer-.
As a matter of fact, the Conference was Iiving
its last hours, The Sodist-Revolutides and Mensheviks,
continuing to deceive the masses, had decided to terminate the
sitting of the Democratic Conference and to appoint a mvis i d Council of the Russian Republic from among its dele
gates. This new body had the right to interrogate the members of the government, while the latter, as in the British
Parliament, could either answer or maintain silence as they
chose. The Council of the Republic was not empowered to
compel them to answer. In general, the Council had no legis-

The Sdt-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, however,
strove to lend this mongrel h d y the appeamnce and role of
a parliamentary institution. In their press they d e d this new '
M y the Pieliminwy Parliament { Pre-parliament ) The Bolsheviks thus had to dmide on their attitude towards this new
Sacialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik institution. The Central Committee issued instructions not to enter the Pre-patliament and to boycott it. This decision was transmitted to the
Bolshevik group in the Democratic Conference.
Kamenev, Ryazanw ;md Rykov, who were members of the
group, were opposed to the decision of the Central Committee.
These mpitulators and defenders of capitaism, fighting
against an armed uprising, insisted on participation in the Preparliament. The opponents of the boycott succeeded in sawing the support of the majority of the Party representatives in
the Dmmratic Conference; 77 of the grwp members, as
against 50, expressed themselves in favor of participating in
the Re-parliament, whose task was to dupe the people.
The opponents of insurrection, instead of fighting for the
immediate capture of power, continued to cling to participation
in the Pre-parliament. This group had to be exposed and

.

"It is the duty of the proletariat, as the leader of the Russian
mvoltttion," wrote Stalin in an editorial of the centrd organ
of the BoIshevik Party, Rdochy Put, "to tear the mask from
this government and to expose its real counter-revolutionary
face to the masses. . It is the duty of the proletariat to
dose its ranks and to prepre tirelessly for the impending
httl:es.
"The workers and soldiers in the Eapita! have already taken
the first step, by passing a vote of no confidence in the Kerensky-Konovdov government.
"It is now for the proviaces to say their word!' (Lmk,
Std?t, 1917, p. 503.)
=4
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XRATIQNS IN THEPROVINCES

1

1

September 23, the Socialist-Revoluti~esand Mashethe All-Russian CtintraI Executive Committee, under
of the masses, had f d l y passed a decision to convene
t Second Congress of Soviets on October lo. Beginning with
.September 27, the Rabochy Pub carried the call:.
la

, a

UFdIow workers, soldiers and peasants! Get ready for thc
All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October ao! Convene
Regional Congresses of Soviets immediately 1"

.

.

.
'
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On Septmber zg, the !Central Committee of the Bolshevik
Farty d v e d to convene a congress of the Soviets of the
Northern Region-Finland, Petrogmd and its environ+wke
a Bolshevik spirit prevailed, to take place on October 5. One
of the -tasks of the Cwgress was to expedite the agitational
and organjzational preparations for armed insurrection. Its
decisions were to serve as a model for the Regional Congresses
'throughout the camtry.
In the latter half of Septembw: 'the work of preparing for
armed insurrection became most intensive in the provinces as
A.The rCeab-al Committee allocated strictly defined fmctians to each of the rariws provinces. The Byelomssian Party
organization, in which Ftunze and Myasnikov were e v e ,
-bas inmeted by the Central Gotmuittee to put out Bolshevik
cordom for the purpose of intercepting troap trains coming
from the western front to the aid of Kerensky. Similar instructions were issued to the Polessye organization which spas
located in Gomel and which was headed by Kagmovich. Txoop
trains passed through Gon~elen route to Petrograd and Moscow. The Volga region, where Kuibyshev was stationed, received instructions, first, t o keep Kereasky from using the local
garrisons, second, to take charge of collecting E d supplies
25
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for the revolution and to prepare stores of grain for shipmetlt
to Petregrad and Mosoow after the Wry of the revdution.
Sverdlw wrote a letter to the Bolsheviks in the Urals instructing them to continue the struggle in the event that the uprising
in Petmgmd and M o m w fell through. The cities and industrial centers of the Urals, like Shadrhsk, where Zhdanov
was active, got armed detachments ready for the uprising.
The Bolsheviks of Northern Caucasus, in the person of
Kirov*were instructed to threaten Kaledin's positions in the
Kuban and Don Region in order to prevent him from moving
his tmops to the assistance of the other counter-revolutionary
forces. An agent of the Central Committee was sent to Voroshilov in the Don& Basin, where he was chairman of the
Bolshevik organization, editor of the loml Party newspaper
and chairman of the Lugansk Soviet, to give him notice* of

AU puwer here was virtually in Voroshilov's
hands. The representatives of the Provisid Government
counted for nothing in this district. The p p I e in the lhnetz
Basin were onIy waiting for a signal from the Central Committee to remove these representativa.
In the Ufa Region the food committees were in the hands
of the Sdalist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and it was
clear enough that they wauld try to stawe the revolution. For
dais reason the Bolsheviks in this region were given instructions to enter these committees, work in them, collect grain
and load it on echdons; these delons, however, were to be
placed on sidings and sent on o d y at the demand of the Central
the insurrection.

Committee.

In Baku, Shaumyan and Djaparidze were among those who
directed preparations for the attack.
There was not a single large region that did not receive
some assignment from the Central Committee.
26
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N a a y , however, the work of prepmbg the ass~ultwaS
most widely developed in Petrograd, where such m l e as
Molotov, Katinin and Andreyev were working under the direct
leadership of .Lenin and S t a h It was here that the plan for
the uprising itself was elabomted. It was proposed to reIy
on the Red Guard, wKih numbered 12poo armed mea at the
beginning of October, the revolutimary d m of K m m t d t
and the Baltic Fleet and certain units of the P
&&
Gar-

On October 3, wben preparations for armed action were suf kiently widespread, the Central Committee decided to request
Lenin to come to P-,
so tbat he w d d be closer to
the center of events.
ZRnin received this decision in Vyborg, whence he had made
his way from Hlsingfors in order to be nearer Petmgrad.
Two days later, Octobw 5, the Central Committee resolved
to withdraw from the Pre-parliament at its very first sitting.
Lienia arrived in Petrograd on October 7, in conformity with
the decision of the Central W t t e e , and immediately
plunged into the preparatory work there.
At this time the international and internal situation had
taken a hun such as put a new light on the question of w e d
insurrection facing the Par&
THE .INTEKNAIITONAL SITUATION
First of all, there had been a mutiny on the ships of the
German Navy stationed in Kid. The sailors of five cruisers
had raised the Red Flag and gone ashore to muse the garrison
to insumdon. The d o r s of the N w d m g had thrown
their d c e r s overboard and steamed 0% to N o m y to join
forms with the Russian tevolution. Surr~undedby stLbmarines
and mine-layers, the ship had been compelled to surrender.

,.

Aftw a tnurmmry trial by court-martial, many af the sailorii
h&d been shot. Approximately 10,sailors of the b a n
Navy had taken part in this movement. It was d W t to hush
up this matter. Some mention of it had treen made ixl the
Reichs,tag. L a i n understood that revolutionary action on the
part of the international working class, which he had foretold
and which revolutionaries abroad were preparing for, was not
a matter of the distant future. If mass action had taken place
even &such a military prison house as m o d i t Germany,
it could be imagined what inflammatory material had accumulated throughout the world.
Today we can avail ourselves of Poinmri's Memoirs, a compilation of information which the censors had held back in
rgr 7. All this material confirms the existence of a revolutionary
situation in England and France.
The correlation of forces within Russia had also changed
to a marked degree. News kept coming in from all parts of
the country about the growth of the peasant uprising, the
national movement for emancipation and the movcrnent in the
army. The revolution had made giant strides in one month.
On the other hand, the counter-revolutionarieswere also taking
steps. Kertmsky was openly preparing to surremder Petrograd
to the Germans, so that the iron heel of the Geman imperialists might crush the revolution.
With this end in view, h was proposed b withdraw the
garrison from Petropd, ostensibly for the purpose of defending the city against the Germans, but actually in order to
remove rhe garrison from the influence of the Bolsheviks.
AII this made the question of the armed uprising more pressing.
On October 10, in the evening, a meeting of the Centrd
Committee of the Bolshevik Party was hefd. Commde S d lov reported on the situation on the northern and western

-
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,'fmats. A Boishdk spirit prevailed there. The Minsk Garr i m wasan the side of the B o l & d s . But at the same t
k
haw, the M-T-revoluti~ndes
were up to smmtbg.
negot&iw ,were in progress between General H e a d q e n
sad S M HIof the Western Front. &BS&S
were
being drawn to Minsk, and agitation waa being arritd on
agahst tbe Bolsheviks, Obviously, preparations were being
made to surround and disarm the fwolutionaq troops.
'
hnin tmk the flow after Sverdlov and delivered a report
on the current situation. After d u g a detailed aaalysis of
the international and i n t d situation, Len& pointed out the
great importance of thoroughgoing technical preparations for

r

armed insurrection.
"From the political sbndpoint," W n summed up, '%the
time
is quite ripe for the transfer of power. , We must discuss
the technid side. That is the whole point." (Lmk,Stalk,

..

1917, p. 580.)

Lmh particularly stressed the fact that the palitid
tion had matured and tbat it was now a question of the time
of the uprising. He came out with the direci propasal to utilize
the Congrw of Saviets of tbe Northern Region and the readiness of the Bolshevik-minded Minsk G w r h n to take the
offensive "to begin decisiw action."
Lenin w'as convinced of the necessity for an immediate offensive; in his opinion further delay would be fatal, and he proposed that anp pretext k seized on to begin the uprising either
in Petrogmd or in Moscow, in Minsk or in Helsingfors. But
under the given circumstanoe8, the decisive battlurrespxiive
of where the uprising began or its immediate =-had
ta
be fought in Petrograd, the politid center of the country and
the d
e of the revolution.
Thus, h n h considered that the point at issue at that pticc-

1

ular moment was the setting of the dote for the uprising.
His d ~ i o n were
s embodied in a short resolution drawn
up by himself and outlining the Party d i d v e s with exeeptional precision and clarity :

"The Central Committee rwgnizes that the international
position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German
Navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth
throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the a t
of conclusion of peace by the imperialists with the object of
stranglhg the revolution in Russia) as well as the military
situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie
and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petropd to the Germans),
and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority
in the S o v i e t 4 this, taken in conjunction with the peasant
revolt and the swing of popular confideme towards our Party
(the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal
of troops from Petragtad, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)--all this
places the armed uprising on the order of the day.
"Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable,
and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Cen-ml Committee
instructs all Party organizations to be guided accordingly,
and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress
of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrad of troops
from Petrograd, the action of our people in MOSCQWand
Minsk, etc.) from this point of view!' (V,I. Luin,Sebctsd
Works, Vol. VI, p. 303.)
At the meeting of the C e n d Committee, Kamenw and
Zinoviw, who were subsequently exposed as traitors, spoke
against Lenin.
These defenders of capitalism were resolutely r e m e d by
the Bolshevik Centia Committee. No one supported thw
arrant capitulators, and Lenin's resolution k a m e the directive for the entire Bolshevik Party.
The preparations for armed insurrectim entered a decisive

'
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t h e Committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided, against two
dissenting votes, tbat the garrim troops should not be withdrawn and that a Revolutionary Military Committee should be
set up to see to the wrying out of this decision. On Octo-

6 13, the Mdiers' Secrion of the Petragrad Soviet endorsd

-the organization of Revolutionary Military Committees. T h e
Revolutionary Military Cornmitt= thus bemme the 1egaHy
functioning headquarters of the uprilng.
The plan for the uprising was based on the directives given
by h i n in his letter "Marxism and Insurrection." It was
propased to summon the Baltic sailors from 'Helsingfors to
the -pita1 to reenforce the Petrogmd units, for which purpose
a coded telegram was drawn up stating: "Dispatch the field
reguhtions." This meant: the uprising has begun, send on

armored cruisers and detachments of sailors.
In every district, committees of three were set up, consisting
of the Chairman of the Soviet, the Party secretary of the district, and a representative of the district Red Guard. These
committees kept a close watch on all milikry institutions,
banks and government o h s of their respective districts.
Definite units of Red Guards were assigned to occupy various
institutions in their districts; others were assigned to go to
the Smolny,* Representatives of the CentraI Committee made
the rounds of all the railway junctions around Petrugrad to
ascertain whether Bolshevik cordons had been posted in those
places to stop Kernsky's troop trains. The Bolshevik organizations were instructed to disarm the soldiers in case ad
necessity.
Mostow was notified of 'the fact that the uprising would

* S d n y htitute, a former &ml for daughters of the Russian
biliry, WIG& had been b h n over by the rwolutionaty organieatima of
workers and soldiepa.-Ed.
3a
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tbe course of the next few days. In its turn Mason the word to Ivanovo, Shuya, Odthovo, etc.
wn received definite instructions. A a
w
l code was
out for purposes of communication with all regional
- h r h g these days, between October ro and r 5, in accordCommittee, Congxewa of Soviets were held in most of the R e g i o n d e Volga

*t

,,amwith the instructions of the Centrat

,

' ,ategion, S i k h , the Ulaaine and Byelorussia. The great
; majority of these congresses followed the lead of the Cwgress
bf Soviets of the Northern Region and adopted resolutions
; d i n g for the transfer of all power to the Soviets.
The crucial moment was approaching rapidly.
On M n ' s proposal another enlarged meeting of the Central
Gmmittee was held on the evening of October 16, together
with representatives from the local Pa@ groups, the trade
unions, and the military organizations of the Petrograd 4
aad Moscow Committee of the Bdshevik Party. The purpose
of this meeting w a s to acquaint wider circles of the Party
membership and the Party octiwe of Petrograd with the measures that had been adopted. About thirty people were present.
Most of the l o d speakers reported that in the unions and in
ttie army feeling was running high and that the masses were
d t i n g for the call to rise in arms. Lenin reported that an
Wober ro the Central Committee had passed a decision to
proceed to hmediitate insurrection, and that only Zmoviw and
&menhad been opposed to the uprising.
S d o v spoke after k i n . He said that the Party numbered
qoo,ooo members, who were extrcmdy favorably distributed:
S o w in Petrograd, p,ooo in Moscow and the Moscow Region, +,ooo in the U d s , and sg on. Such a on of
shocZr groups gmady enharwad tht role of the Bolshevik Party,
33
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After Svwdlov had informed the meeting of the preparatory
the other regions, the floor was thrown open for discussion.
Onee more the traitors Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke against

uprising five d a y s t h r e e days. StaIin refuted these capi

in and Stalin, The RPLS&H
RmoIution, p. 226.)

ns of the bourgeoisie with contempt and confirmed the
resoIution proposed by LRnin. After this, the kembers of the
Central Committee adjourned to another room and at a closed
eeting decided to set up a Party center, headed by Stafii,

e next day.

The members of the Party cerrter were instructed

lutionary Military Committee, for the purpose of guiding the
mrk from within that body, of being the very spirit of the
uprising. After this, the meeting a adjourned and the members of the Party Center left for their various duties. The
=I uprising had bem set for not later than October 20 [Novrm-

I
t

E Z I N O W V - W N E V TREACHERY
hf&eii in the CenW M f f e e I Z
Iand
a monstrous act of ttacherp. They sent a stat+
e Meushdk newspawr, Nmh ZIpigrp ( O w W*),
they announced that the Bolsheviks were pi n s u r d o n and that they considered thc uprising a rash
We. This statement was &vet!
by Sukhanov, the editor,
' + d ohanded it over to his fellow party m d . The secmt'
&f the eontempkited upding was divulged to the enemy. A
'r'mdng of the Bureau of the All-Russian C a t r d Executive
&rimittee of Soviets was called immediately, The M s t Xevolutionaries and Mensheviks, who dominated this m e b g ,
p s e d a decision to postpone the c o n d o n of the Second
G n p s s of Soviets from OCzo to O c m h 25 [Hopemt%era to Noyember 71, and to invite all Regional organizations
and primarily the miIihuy orgmkathns to partidpate in it.
This maneuver of the petty-bourgeois counter-revolutirmaries
was very simple. T'he So+&-Revolutides
and M e n s b
viks hoped that by postpaning the G m g r s s to October 25
they muId be able to bring an element of disorganhtiw into
the ranks of the soIdiers of the r d u t i m . On the ather hand,
they counted on &g the additional time to pack the Congress
with SkiaG~t-Revolrtti~es
and Mensheviks. Hitherto the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mmsheviks had h e n opposed to
the Congmss, bad ignored the Congress; at presmt, however,
they ? q a n making feverish prepations for it: id the expectation of gaining control over it.
Due to the treachery of Zinovkv and Kamenev, the Mgod Govefpment learned of the preparations that were being
inade by the Bolsheviks. Kmmsky was at General Hdquartms
in M o g f d e ~ ;he was immediately d e d back to the capital.

,
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On the morning of October 18 the Menshevik p a p , the
N m p Z&n (ThN m Life), a m out m+q Zmoviev's
and Hammer's statement. Simultaneously with the appearance
of the paper, the garrison regiments received an urgent and
strictly confidential order, signed by CbloneI Polkovnikov of
General Headquartem, who was in command of the Petrograd
MiliEary Area. This order called for the following steps to be
taken: ( I ) dl attempts at demonstrations in the city were
to be suppressed, ( 2 ) any one found arrying on agitation for
an armed uprising was to be arrested and sent to Area Headquarters, (3) the city was to be divided into districts, in each
of which horse and fkt patrols were to be posted with the
aim of suppressing all signs of unrest, and (4) all meetings
and gatherings were to be prohibited.
In addition to this, Junkers from the military schools in
adjoining towns were called out to Petrograd. The Winter
Paface U s o n was re- forced, and now numbeted r , b men.
A telegram was sent to the front, demanding the dispatch of
troops. Communication was established by direct wire with
G a d Cheremisov, who was in command of the Northern
Front and who was to dispatch cavalry and bicycle detachments
to help put down the uprising. The militia was placed under
the military authorities and augment4 by abut 600 picked
offleers, loyal to the Provisional Government.
In short, such measures were taken as to d e it hpxsibl
for the uprising to begin within the next few days. If th
Bolsheviks had launched the offensive on October 19 or
they would have falten into the trap set by the enemy. Th
uprising had to be postpcmed. Such was the pr&l
effect
of Zinoviev's and Kameaev's treachery.
The postponement of the uprising, however, did not mean
th$ prepnitions were to cease.

'
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:The Centtat

Committee of the Bolshevik ParQ used t
h
dorced delay to mobilize still greater forces and to prepare

I more thoroughIy. The first thing that was done was t~ go
wr the pfaa for the armed uprising with an eye to the eventaIity that the enemy might mmhow get'wind of the detairs
Ithis plan. The decision pprrs made to use not only the r a m
&md
Red Guards, but also the many thmmdr of mrkrr who wanted to join them but had not been enm1Ie.d berrrse of the shortage of arms.

'RE ARMING OF THE WORKERS
A large qrraatity of arms was

stored in the Peter and Pad

P m s and the Kronwerk Arsenal, The a

f d

workers had

mmmnt a d i s p a e over ro,m rifles tu the Don @om.
:This was really ao, for taking into account the pussibility of
Bolshevik victory in Petthe wunter-re.volutiwarie8
prepared a pkrce d'rPr;#o~in the &n region beforehand
were dispaaeh'mg artillery, m a c h i n q p i s and rffles there.
At the suggestion of the
Center, a reprcsenktive of
the Revolutioruy Military C d t t e e was wt as a c o r m i s m
to the Peter and Paul Fortress. His job was to exercise contml
over thc actions of the commandant of the Fomeq and, above
to prevent the shipment of arms to the Don. The comcmtemptuously refused to aee the commissar, wherethe h#e+wmt wt onto the square and delivered a rowto the soIdiers and workers of the Arsenal. This
m u t e talit was stdEeimt to make the irate soldiers and
workers retarn with the c m m h a r to fhe eommmda~t'sdice
k the Fortress. The commmdant immediately rushed to the
to report thii Iatest development to his superiors,
.while the commissar sat down at the w
~ desk and s

~~
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hgan to sign orders for the issuance of arms. Several trucks
seemingly sprang up from the very ground, and cases of arms
were quiddy l d e d on them and dispatched to the Putilov,
Qbukhov and other laxge factories of Petrograd. Thanks to
the vigilance of the workers, the rifles that were to have gone
to ths Don were in the hands of the Bolshwiks.
The Revolutionary Military Conmitee sent commissars to
the Garrison regiments in order to win over the entire Garrison to its side. Late in the night of October 20, these commissars appeared in the various regiments. In a very short time
there were two hundred of them and in the course of the next
few days their number increased to six hundred.
The task of the commissars was to isolate the oficers, arresting them if they showed resistance, t o create a firm nucleus
in every reghmt of soIdiers who were lo@ to the revolution,
to arm them and to be ready for action at the word of tbe
Revolutionary Military Committee. In order to make a thorough job of winning over the Garrison, a permanent bodythe Council of Regimental Delegates-was aet up. Every day
at six p.m hundreds of regimental delegates would come to
the Smolny where they would hear the fiery speeches of Bolshevik agitators. They would leave these meetings for heir
various regiments carrying with them a spirit of the most
ardent revolutiopary enthusiasm. As a result of all these measures, not only picked units but the overwhelming majority of
the Petrograd Garrison fought on the side of the Bolsheviks
in the October Revolution.
The success with which the commissars met made it possible
to send military commissars into Staff Headquarters of the
Petrograd Military Area, the very heart of Ihe counterrevolution. Acting on instructions of the RwoIutionary Military Committee, three of its representatives turned up at Area
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Headquarters and announced that not a single order would
be d e d out unless it was countersigned by the Revoluti
Military Committm.
Glonel ~olkovnik6vrefused to accept the commissars,
on October 22 Area Headquarters tried to send out its orders
over their heads. But within the spce of thirty minutes, Colonel
Polkodkov was convinced that the Bolsheviks had not been
joking. All the orders that had been sent out by him came back
with the inscription: "Not valid unless countersigned by
the Revolutionary Military Committee."
Greatly alarmed, P&oMikav reported this to Kmvalov,
vice-chairman of the Council af Ministers. The latter rush
to the Winter Palace to report to Kerensky.
The appointment of regimental commis8ars and the demand
which the Revolutionary Military Committee made on Area
Headquarters to submit all its orders to the former far endorsement was regarded by the goverament as the begidng of
the actual seizure of power by the Soviets.
The Provisional Government had been living in a state of
constantly growing alarm these last days. The Bolsheviks had
hem keeping the govefnmwt in the greatest tension.
AU the newspapers were filled with rumors from "reliable
sources," hints and prophecies. On October I$ the Ryech,* the
Cadet newspaper, carried the following item :
"Around I a.m. on the morning of October IS, Miitia Hadquarters of the capital began to receive reports from various
commissariats about sr~spicious movements of armed R

On the following day, the same newspaper wrote:
- 'The Bolsheviks are preparing to act. Formerly, in order to
keep up appearances they claimed that they were against direct

..
a&&.

Now they have broken all born& and stop at nothing!*
On October 18:

"The Bolsheviks are feverishly, stubbornly and persistendy
preparing a blood bath. They are procuring arms, dtawing up
a plan of action and mcupying vantage grounds."

On October 19:

'

"The Bolsheviks are hastily arming the factory and mitl
workers for the impending outbreak. On October 17and 28,
d f l e s and revolv-were
issued to the workers in the
BoMevik stronghold, the Vyhrg district. On October 18,
the workers of Bolshaya and Malaya Okhta and of the Putilov
Works received arms."
On October m:

r
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"Today is October zo, a day beginning a momentous week :
which not only St. Petersburg but all Russia associates with I
new alarm and new anxieties. Let us give credit to the Bolsheviks where credit is due. They are using every possible meam
to maintain the shte of alarm at the necessary high pitch, to
render expeetations keener and to bring nervous tension to
1
meh extremes that guns will begin to shmt o f themselves."
Every day the Ministers were besieged with the question:
'will the Bolsheviks take action tday ? Komvalov told newspaper comspdents :

"On October 16, the Provisional Government was not aware
e of the Bolshevik outbreak. On the previous
Government had b g u n to receive informas had decided to take action on the I*
everyone had supposed. Apparently the
Bolshevih t h m l w s have not yet arrived at a definite decision
on this question."

Thus Kwovalov tried to comfort himelf,
Matters were still, further compliated for the Provisional
Government by the fact that the Bolsheviks were prepring
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the Bolshevik b c t h of t h e days.

'The revoIution," wrote Comrade Stdim, "aa it were, canmouIfhged its offensive actions behind a screen of defense in order
*by
to draw into its orbit the irresolute and wavering el+
.meats." (Ststin, On t h Octobw Rmlrrbio~r,p. k,Ruacs. ad.)
The constant state of h i s i o n hi which the Provisional GoP.
emmmt rn hdd by the Bolshwika caused chaos and dimrgan' h i o n m its midst. The Government d d not emerge from
the crisis in which it was plunged. No sooner bad the resigmation of Malptori&, the Minister of Justice, been hushed up,
than VerkhovSay, the Minister of War, amom~@d
Ids re-

On the morning of October q the Rwolutimay Militaty
Committee made public its appointmmt of commimm to dl
military units of the Garrison. This annommmmt stated:

Thii d-tion

.

of the Revolutionary Military Committw'

to move forces to Peh.ograd in a freng of haste. Brticu&ly

'urestaken by the Gwernmmt explain in part why jht uprising.
' d m on for seveml days in MO~MIW:
the c ~ l ~ l t g - m l u ~
'tiomries had managed to prepare.
The hasty steps taken by Kerensky gave him r a s a to how: I'
that tmop would arrive in short time.,

'

But Kerenslq did not h o w even the apptoximate date of the
Bolshevik uprising. Here it was that the treachery of Trotsky
eame to the assistance of the Provisional Gwernment. In
answer to a question put by a soldier in the Petrograd Soviet as
to whether the Bolsheviks were preparing for an uprising,
Trotsky replied that any action the Bolshwiks might take would
have to lx postponed to October 25 [November 71, when the
Second Congress of Soviets was to open. Kerensky thereupon
decided to take action two days before this date.
He immediately summoned General Manikovsky, newlyappointed chief of the War Office, and General Cheremisov,
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, to see him. Both
generals r e p o d on the measures that had been taken to combat the Bolsheviks.
On W o k 23, in the evening, the Staff of the Petrogd
Military area was closeted in a confidential session with Kernsky. General Bagratuni, Chief of Stafl, reported in detail on the
measures taken to deal with the Bolshevik rising.
It was decided at this meeting to hunch the attack on October
24. A plan was adoptcd and transmitted to the regimental
commanders. It was late at night when the meeting broke up.
The Cammder of the Finnish Regiment gave this plm to a
typist to be typed in several copies. The latter made an extra
copy of the plan and that same night delivered it to the Rev*
lutionary Military Committee.
The Revolutionary Military Committee in its turn had decided to begin the uprising no later than October 24. The copy
of Kerensws plan merely served to confirm the correctness of
this decision, for it had become quite dear that the counterrevolutionaries were trying to forestall the revolution. By order
of the Revolutionary Military Committee, each regiment sent
out'two liaison m a , who were to be on duty in the SmoIny,
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p m m h of the printing shop of the Rubochy Put (Wwkerb
path), which was appearing in p h of t b P ~ A that had
been b e d by the Kermsiq Gavernmetit, with a warrmt of
the Provisional Government, dated October 23, for the conWtion of the paper and the arrest of the editor. The workers
refused to r-e
Ws ~ ~ since
~ l it was
l tnot hntersigaed
by tRe Revolutionmy M h t q Committee, and a reuproar
& in. At the sound of the fmam, worikers w h were
~
burrpfarg
to the fMories in fhe early hwrs of the morning b e g a ~to
~
gather at the printing shop. Among them were a number of
Red Guards, one of whom informed the .secmhry of the
Rozhdestveaka District Commit-tee of the Party about the raid
that had been made on the central o w of tbe Party. The
larang up Stah.
SGllia immediately d e d up the armored a r dision, which
was loyal to the BoMeviks, and at the same time warned the
Revolutiomq M i l i w Committee that ECerensky was attempting to s
d the Rdochy Put. The Rew1utionary Militafy
CoaLmittee dispatched taro companies of the Lithuanian Regimeat that w m on duty. The revolutimmy sofdiers and the Red
Guards pressed back the armored cmrs and p W a reinfomed
guard w w the printing shop and the editorid offices of the
Rabochy Prot. Towrds XI a.m. the Rabochy Pwt m e out with
a call for the overthrow of the Provisional Gwernment.
Arwnd 10 am, Kerensb, who had occupied tbe apartment
in the Winter Palace of Alexander the Third, father of the
Tsar (apparently in pqaratim for assuming the role of
Napoleon), d d e d to the &ws of the Provisional Govern-
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and informed the Ministers tbat the plaaned attack o

K e r e n e deliver this information to the meeting of the P ~ P
parlitnt in order to secure'the &tame
of the latter. After
having received a report from Pollkovnhv to the effect that
soldiers had been dispatched from the front, that cycle detachments muld arrive at Petrograd on the aqth and that
tmstwwhy people had been sent out to meet them, K e r e n e
left for the session of the Pm-parliament. When he arrived,
the Menshevik Minister Nikitin was delivering a lengthy and
tedious report on the chaos in the food situation throughout the
country. The deputies were rambling about in the o(1rridors.
Suddenly they caught sight of Kerensky. His agitated appearance was plain to see. The deputies began to sack back to the
hall. As soon as Nikitia left the platform, Kerwsky to& his
place and began imm&cly :

"I d d e r it my duty to quote to you some of the most
characteristic passages taken from various proelamatians
printed in the Rabocky Put and written by-that archdminal
Ulyanov Lenin, who is wanted by the state!'
Thereupon Kerensky, amidst shouts and calls fnrm the auiiience, began to read the passages from h
i
& "A Letter to the
Comrades" in which Len21 flays the traitors Zinwiev and
Kamenw and argues in favor of an armed uprising. Kerensky
wnduded his speech on a hystwicd note:
"Thus, I must state to the Provisional Council of the Russian

A regular hubbub arose. Members of the audience demanded
that K e r e d q explain how it was that he had &owed things
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Konodov suddenly mounted the steps of tbe platform
.,and handed Kwensky a note. Kemuky hurriedly read it
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through Bnd agitatedly raised his hand for silence, iadimtkg
'
that he had not yet concluded his apparently tished speech,
S I u m f e . . Kere*
conhued :

.'

"Ihavejlutbeenhandedaeop~ofadae~twhichirnow

. circulating among the regiments."

I

In the hushed hall, Kermslcy read out:

" 'Danger threatens the PetSoviet. You are hereby
structed to keep your regiment in complete military preparedness and to await further orders. Any delay or failure to cornpJy with this order will be d e e d treachery to the revolution.
'The Revolutionary M i l i t q Cornmi#=' "
Pandemonium broke loose. The deputies rushed to the platform with d&ed fists. Kerensb was blamed for the uprising
that was beginning. The deputies demanded that the most
stringent measures be taken. A 2 :05 p.m., amidst stormy a p
plause, K e m k y , having secured the consent of d parties to
any measures that he might see fit to take against the Bolsl~eviks, hastened to the Winter Palace for the purpose of proceeding agrinst the uprising.
While Kerensky had been delivering his hysterical and
lengthy speech, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bot
shevik Party had taken place in the Smolny. Here, without any
specks or loss of time, tfie following decisions had h e n
adopted : Dzenhinsky was to occupy the Post and Telegraph
Office; the two representatives of the Kronatadt Swiet who were in Petrogd at the time were to be sent to Krmistadt;
3,foxow was to be infarmed of the commtmcemmt of the armed
uprising, for which purpose one representative was to b sent
there tbnt day and another the next ;two thousand Red Gum&
were to k s~rmm~nedfrom
45
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Sverdlov was instructed to keep a watch over every step of the
Provisiorutl Government. In short, the entire carefully-prepxed
sm of i n s d o n had been set in motion.
At ,3,p.m., when j d e r detachments appeared at the drawon Kerenskyls orders to raise them and cut off the
working dass districts from the center, the counter-revoIutionary troops found Red Guards, sailors and soIdiers from the
Garrison already posted there by order of the Revolutionary
Military Committee. As a matter of fact, they had been there
for so long that the Red Guards at the Nilayevsky Bridge
had settled dawn for a nap, and the Junkers, taking them by
surprise, seized the bridge.
Learning of this, the Revolutionary Military Committee
issued orders to the commissar of the cruiser Aurom to land a
party and recapture the bridw Around 5 p.m. the Peter and
Paul Fortress fhalIy went over to the side of the revolution.
By 5 p.m. the Telegraph Office had been a m . Code messages were immediately sent out to all regions with the information that the uprising had begun.

LEMN AT SMOLNY
A note describing all

measures that had been taken was
sent to k i n , who was anxiously awaiting news at his secret
lodgings in the Vyborg district. He hastily wrote a note asking
pmission of the Central Committee to go to the Smolny. The
housewife in whose apartment Lenin was staying undertook
to deliver the note, but was unable to cross by way of the
Nikolayevsky Bridge since the Junkers had occupied it. Therefore she delivered the note to the Vyborg District Committee
of the Party and from there its contents were transmitted by
phone to Stdin at the Smdny. The latter replied that it would
be too dangerous for Lenin to leaw his place of concealmen*
the
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npm reeiving this rep(l, L d n rmt. another I-,
this
time a fairly long cme. This L the famous leqfcr that be&l~
as foUm.:

'Comrades,
"I am writing these lines on the evening of October a+ The
I situation is critid in the extreme. It is absolutely clear that to
dday the iasumdm now will be veritably fatal.
n
We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night,
wrest the Government, i h t disarming the Junkers (defeating
them, if they mist), and so forth.
Under no circumstances
must the power be left in the h d s ' o f Kerensky d Co. until
the 25th-not under any circumstances; the matter must be
decided without fail this very evening, or this very night."
, (Lenin and Stdin, The Russiafi Rmolutiotr, pp. 23-3r.)
Taking this letter the same comrade made her way to the
Smolny. She was obliged to go all the way on foot as the streetwere not running. By the time she returned, the Central
Committee had already sent for Lenin. There was a representative of the Centd Committee ia the apartment. In order to
avoid an argument &Kith his hostess, Lenixl seat her to the
,%dny with a third note to the Central Commit&. When she
returned the apartment was dark No one was home. The table
waa set for two in prepatation for the evening d.
And on
, the bottom of one plate was scrawled: "I have gone to the
place you didn't want me to go to."
Lenin had donned a wig, put a bandage around his £ace and
had gone out with the Control Committee representative.
'
On the way a street-car passed them, h
d for the a[ bun, Lenin hoppad on thiwph the fmnt cnhracr The driver
was a woman.
'Where are you mhing to?" he asked.
'What a question t" she replied. "And yau a work, tool
Not to know where we're going! Why, m're going to k n d
the shdkgs out of the bourgeois $
47
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upon hearing this, hain began to e w i a to the driver what
was behind dl these events. His companion was on pins and
needles. The car was packed and LRnin might be mmgnhd
at any minute. Fortunately, the car turned into the terminus
just then and the two jumped off.
They arrived at the Smolny around midnight after
diikulties. L.4n immediately went upstairs to the second story,
sent for Stalin, and without removing his wig sat down on a
window-sill to wait for him. Just then the Menshevik Dan
m e out of the Conference Hall carrying a package. Undoing
the @age, he turned to bis companions and said :"I'm f
fuUy hungry. Wouldn't you like some sandwiches?"
b ~ u i t by
c chance, he glanced in the direction of the window
and apparently recognized Lenin. Slowly, he tied up his pschge
again and moved off to the door. Laughiig and wink'~ng,the
others shuffied out after him.
Stalin came in and told Lmh about all the measures that
bad been taken.
After. middght messengers carrying news of -the uprising
hurried tbrough the city, d i n g out new detachments. According to a prearranged p h , these detachmats -pied
the
premises of government institutions. They met with no resistance on the part of the guards. In une place the soldiers declared that they would not surrender. The Red Guards unslung
their rifles, but it soon
dear tbat it was all a misundersWng+he soldiers mesnt that they would not smcnder to
the Provisionat .Govemmeot, as for the Revolutionary Military
Committee, they were only too eager to assist it in every way,
The two detachments thus d n e d on guard there.
At r rg +m. the post o0ice was accupid At 2 am. th
y stations and tbe power station were taken. The pawer was
hudiatdy shut off in the Witer Palace. At 6 a.m. the State

U

Bank was eked, Thus the mchlht revolution did not repeat
&e mista%e of the Paris Commune, which had left the bank in'
&c hands of the counter-revolu~ehi.
At 7 am. tbc Paface Bridge under Kerensky's very windows
was taken, Glancing through the window Kerenslry IooM out
out a sea of Red Guard bayonets. He realized that there muld
be no question of any attack on his part now. b h g no time,
he dashed over to Ara Headquarters. Polkovnikov, who
been so confident only the day before, today, at the dawn of
October 25, a n m m c d that not a single regiment had come
out and tbat even the Cossacks were refusing to budge During
the night the district hezrdquarters of the Red @urd Lad sturormded the Cossack r e g k n b . When the G s s x k s attempted
to -1
their barracks, they were confronted with machfne
guns. Several Jrrnker schools, as, for
the hvlwsky
School for J&s,
were likewise surrounded in $sod time,

KERENSKYS FLIGHT
-

1

d

Kerensky realized that his ody salvation lay in fight.
IXe decided to apply to the foreign powers for assisttame An
adjutant was sent to the Italian military attack with a request
for an a u t o d . The latter said tbat he would be deIightad
to give his car to the Supreme Command, but that he had no
gasoline. Thereupon the adjutant d e d off to the Ameria
attache. The Amerbn wid that he w d d give him a cat. but
insisbed that fie be taken to see the Commander-in-Chief. The
inquisitive Yankee was then taken to the Winter Palace dme
he saw Keredcy and shook hands with him e y , Ke@
got into the car, which a flying the American hg, and was
driven wt to the Square.
Seeing the flag of a foreign power, t$e Red Guards d d
the automobile to pass. Swiftly KerrarLy sped down the

Nevsky, to Tsarskoye Syelo and from there to Pskov, w h i i
was s part of the front. This Sght of the Prime Minister of
the k t bourgeois governmeat was an admission by ICerensky
of the victory of the revolution in Petrograd; not, of course,
that the revolution needed any such admission.
At 10 a n on the morning of the 25th Leuin wrote the
farmus manifesto "To the Citizens of Russia" in the Smolny.

"The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The
power of state has passed into the hands of the organ of the
Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and SoIdiers' Deputies, the Revolutionary Military Committee, which stands at the head of
the Petrograd proletariat and garrison.
"The cause for which the people have fought-the immediate
proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlordism,
workers' control over production and the creation of a Soviet
Government-is assured.
"Long live the revolution of the workers, soldiers and
psants !"
At Ir a.m. this manifesto could already be seen posted
throughout,the city. Nothing remained in h hands of the
Provisional Government bat the Winter Palace. All government
itlstitutions had been taken without a single shot bekg fired.
All roads leading to Petrograd were in the haads of the

I t was decided to attack the Winter Palace as soon as the
sailors arrived from Hdsingfors atld Kronstadt. The Kronstadt detachment w a s held up, however, because of stormy
wmther at sea. Moreover, for every ten men called up, a
hundred volunteered, which complimted setting up the detachments and dispatching them.
Meanwhile, at 2 :35 p.m. a special meeting of the Petrograd
Soviet ma opened. Lain addressed this meeting for the first
time after aa e n f o r d absence of over three and a half months.
In a brief speech, Lenin reported the victory of the revolution.

"From now on," he said, ''a new phase in the history of
Russia begins, and this revaltltion, the third Russian revolution, should in the end lead to the victory of socialism"

1

.

The Petrograd Soviet resolved to place dl its 3,memk s at the disposal of the Revolutionary Military Committee.
The meeting had s m e l y been concluded when the ships
from Krwtadt steamed into the month of the Neva. The
d o r s h d e d in quick order and took up their posts. The
Winter P a h e wae completely surrounded. Preparations for
the assault on the Palace begaa The Peter and Paul Fortress
was to raise the Red Flag, and upon seeing this the Aurora
wodd fire a round from its six-inch guns. This was to be
the signal for the attack. Wishing to spare the furces of the
mvolutionary army as much as pssible and to save the Palace
building itself from destruction, the Revolutionary MilitaFy
Committee decided to present the Provisional Gwmment
with an ultindurn, The demand to surrender the Palace on
pain of artillery fire was hastily written on a scrap of paper
and given to a rankad-file member of the cycle detachment
who volunteered to deliver it. Waving a white haadkerchief
as a flag of truce the cyclist approached the Winter Palace.
The Junkers took him to the Staff Headquarters of the Military h,which adjoined the Palace. There he met Kishkin,
who had been appointed dictator of the city a*
Kmkyl
flight, and his two assistan+PalchinsEry and Ruthenberg.
The cyclist deIimred the ultimatum. In the rush, they had
forgotten to set a time limit for the dtimatum and the cy~liist
bimseIf set the limit at twenty minutes.
,ceiaing the ultimatum, KishIdn dashed into the P a h e to
cunfer with the Government. The members of the Provisional
Govexnment were in the M-tov
Hall, from the windows
of which the Peter and Paul Fortress and the cruiser Aurora
51
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could be seen Before replying it rn decided to consult General Headquarters. Either through treachery or because proper
pteautionary measures had not yet ken tzLm by the insurgent
masses, a connection was established with General Headquarters
by d i e wire. The tape recording tip conversation has been
presemed. Dukhonin reprted that troops had been dispatched
and proposed that the Government hold out till they arrived.
Upon receiving this information, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, the Menshevik Niltitin, called up Moscow. The telephone operator at the Exchange managed to fool the inexperie n d Red Guard who was stationed there to keep a check on -the calls she put through, and connected Nikitin with Rudnev,
the Socialist-Revolutionary Mayor of Moscow. Rudnev was
informed of the ultimatum, of the conversation with Dukhonin
and of the decision not to surrender. He was also told that in I
the event of the arrest of the Provisional Government, he, I
Rudnev, was charged with the formation of a new government.
Meanwhile the twenty minutes had dapsed. The cyclist t m e d
'

I.
I

,

to Genera1 Poradelov and demanded an answr. Poradelov
asked for an aclditional ten minutes, so that he could get in
touch with the Winter Palace. The cyclist agreed to give him
ten more minutes. While the general was talking to the Pdace
aver the phone, the cyclist went out of the buildmg into the
street, where under cover of the darkness the Red Guards bad

hgm to gather. Exactly ten minutes Iater, the doors of the
Staff Headquarters were burst open, and the Red Guards entered and arrested Poradelov, who was still at the phone, and
all the Staff officers.
The news of the seizure of Staff Headquarters was taken to
mean the fall of the Winter Mace. A11 further preparations
wise stopped and the commanders of the revolutionary troops
began to rush towards the Winter Mace. They were met with
P
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m c ~ e - g wfire. ~t was ming on g pm. before t i e
thing was strakghtmed out and the mistake cleared up.
sent a note from the Smolny to the commander of the revofu-

tionary troops besieging the Winter Palace, ordering him to
attack immediately. At g p.m. a tRarning shot w& M fromw
the Peter and Pad Fortress, followed by the thunder of the
six-iach guns of the AWMB-The attack ahrrd begun.
The Red Guards rolled out a three-iach gun, mounted it{
under the arch leading to the Palace Square, and fired two shdls I
point-blank at the Winter Palace. One shell broke d part of
the cornice, mother hit the room adjoining the qne in w W
the members of the Provisional C;wmmmt were sitting. The

'

I

Ministers moved to the inside rooms of the Palace.
The first group of saiIors that forred its way into the Wmkr
Palace was captured, but the appearance of Red Guards within 1 1
the P a h e had caused extreme consternation ia the tanks of
its defenders. In order to raise the general spirit, Palchinsky
called together some of the Junkers and began to d d i v e ~a
speech to them. He told them that Kerensky's troop were
approding Petrograd and had taken Luga, same thirty kilo- I
meters from P e t r w d .
Sudddy someone shouted out: ''Lugs is not thirty kilometers from Petrograd but one hundred and thirty! You
ought to h o w portr geography I"
The effect of the speech was entirety lost. hkhimky made
no attempt to a h what he had been saying, turned and went
out. Sqme of the Junkers hasbed from the hall, shouldered
arms and left the Palace. NevertheIess, there were still over nine
hundred armed Junkers, exclusive of officers, in tbe Palace.
In older to amash the resishxe of the defenders of the h2
Winter Palace, artillery iire was opened on it from the Peter

.
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same time rifle and machine-gun f i e opened up. The

Pro-

visional Government would fall at any moment now. For the
last time Nikitin rang up the Municipal Duma. Kuskovq a
Constitutional-Democrat members of the Duma, informed him
that a delegation consisting of representatives from all the
parties ms heading for the Winter Palace. The members of
the Municipal Duma were discussing the question of whether
to go to the Winter Palace. The floor was taken by Minister
Prokopvich, who compIained that he had not been d o w e d to
enler the Palace.
"Now, when our chosen representatives are facing death, let
us forget party differences and brave dmtb together," proposed

They got out onto the

and began to form ranks. Just
then the delegation that had left for the Winter PaIace returned. The deputies of the Municipal Duma retraced their
steps and entered the building again. The delegation informed
them that they had not been permitted to board the Awwa or
to enter the Winter Palace.
Then lCountess Panina took the floor and decked that if
the deputies were not permitted to enter the Winter Palace, they
could at least stand before the guns and die in front of the
Wmter Palace.
Once again the deputies went out onto the street and began
to fall in. This time a representatives of the AU-Russian
easant Council came running up with the request to wait for
street

he third time. On the way to the Winter Palace they were
by a detachment of seven sailors and entered into a
with them. The sailors d e c l a d that the Revolutionary

.

Military Coqnittee had given orders to d m no one to
Voices were raised in angry shouts. One of the sailors
out sharply above the tumult: "Disperse to your homes
leave us in peace I" It was sufficient for these political wrp
hear a d s e d voice for them all to turn back.
In any case, it was too late to go to the Whtw Palac&
At r I p.m. sharp, a rifle shot rang out as the signal for the
h a l attack. Red Guards rushed the Winter Palace from alf
sides. In places they were beaten off, but they managed to break
in through most of the entrances and began to mtter through
the halls on the fist and second stories. They soon came upm
the room where the P r o v i s i d Government was sitting and
placed its members under arrest. Their names were taIren down,
a check up was made to see if they were all there, and they
were then convoyed to the Peter and Paul Fortress by way of
the Troitsky Bridge. When the men at the foxtress saw the
' convoy approaching they opened fire, thinking the enemy was
attempting an attack. The order was given to fall prone, and
down the Ministers went. After a moment or so ffie fire ceased.
Wet and muddied, the Ministers rose from the ground and
entered the fortress. Rumor bas it that when they were being
placed in their cells, one of the Ministers complained to Uritsky,
who had been appointed commandant of the fortress, that the
cells were damp and very close; to which Uritsky replied :'Yo
built these cells yourselves, you have only purseIves to blame.

POWER PASSES TO THE SOVIETS
The news of the capture of the Wmter Palace was sent to th
Smolny, where the Second AlERussian Congress of Sovie
had been opened at 104 5 p.m. on Lain's proposal.
The B o l s h ~ ssecured an o v e r w h majoriv
~
at tb
Congress. The Mensheviks, Bundists and Right S
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RevoIutionaries, seeipg that their day was done, left the 'Con.grws, announcing that they refused to take any part in its
Iabors, T h e Congress condemned them and, far from q m t t h g
their withdrawal, we1mmed it, for with their departure the
Congresn had become a genuinely Molutiomry congress.
The news of the storming of the Winter Palace was received
with the wildest enthusiasm. The Cmgress prodah& that all
power had passed to the Soviets.
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"Back& by the will of the vast majority of the workers,
soldiers and peasants, backed by the victorious uprising of th
workers and the garrison which has taken p h e in Petrograd,
the Congress takes the power into its own hands," the proclam4
tion of the Second Congress of Soviets read.

~ ~ 4Lenin
t hnor
~ Staiin spoke at this sitthg of the congress.
The two organkers of the victorious revolution were en&
in work of exceptionally great impartarm at the time. The
Provisional Government had left Petrogmd only a
day supply of bread and flour, hoping in this way to'make the
Bolsheviks' first gift to the peopl+hunger. All day and all
night Lenin and Stdin worked at organizing armed detachments, placing a Bolshevik in command of each, and sending
them out to wkh the dty, to scour the stations, to open all
mihad an,but to find flour or grain. And on the a6th of
W b e r the leaders of the revolution received the report: grain
sufficient for ten days bad been found.
It was only then that Leain put in his apmrance in the
SmoIny hall. When Lenin took the floor, he was unable to hgin
his spach b u s e of the stormy ovation he was acwrded as
the leader and organizer of the victorious revolution. Finally,
quieted down and Lmin begm to rpak. Without my solemn declarations, without any long-winded inductions, he shwd his speech by reading the decree on peace.

"
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And this d m ,Wears-like beginning iRiis &a6&siic
of
stem face of the revolution, was characteristic of all the f
work. L w i spoke a second time at this sitting, resding out the
deeree w the h a , S~CCMto which over rp,oQom
ddatins * of former Iandtord, crown and monastery land passedinto the hands of the tailing pasantryhunderous applause and cheers burst forth for the third
time when the formation of the Council of People's Commkam
was announced--the fist workers' and psants' governmeat
in the -Id
in the first vidoriotls socialist revolution. Lenin
l ~ a sendorsed as
of the Council of People's Corn-

I

missam, and Stalin, who had built up the Bohh&
Party
t-er
with Lenin, who had -red
the great October Socialist Rwdtttiw together with Lenin,who had led it to victory
togetber with hh,waa d r m e d its the People's C o d s a r

4

of Nationalities.

WHY THE REVOLUTION WAS VICTORIOUS
.

Not a single revohtion in the world was so bloodless as the
revolution in Petmgrad.
The History of iks Communist Pwty of the S d t Union
analyzes the reawns for the victory of the revolution with exc e p t i d profundity.
The great October Sodalist Revolution, it says, was victorious, first, because it "was cwfronted by an enemy so comparatively weak, so M l y organized and so politically inexperienced as the Russian bourgeoisie." (Op. kt., p. 2x2.)
Russian capitalism had made its appearance on the world
arena when a11 the free territory of the globe bad already been
occupied by countries in which capitalism had developed much
d i e r and was conswuentlv on a much hkher plane. The onh

'
'
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way to wrest a god bit for oneself now was by brute force.
Tsarism with its mighty army of one and a half millions posscssed this quality.
The Russian bourgeoisie needed tsarism as a police fmce
over the proletariat. That is why the bourgeoisie supported tsarism, and especially its &tory
foreign policy. This suppoe
partly explains why tsarism existed for so long in Russia, b e
overtbrown only in February, 1917.
13ut the Crimean campaign (in 1854) had already shown
that it was beyond the powers of Russia to compete with capitalist Europe. T h e unsuccessful war, in which the flintlock of
tbe Russian army was so badly beaten by the rBed bore, tore
the mask from the supposed might of tsarism: to the eyes of
the astoni4lred world Russia now appared a colossw with feet
of clay. To make up a11 the shortcomings and to wrest itself
from foreign dqendence, it was necessary to accelerate the
growth of large-scale industry. The tsarist government bepn to
build more railways and more iron and steel works. Subsidies
were granted to the capitalists. In order to protect its own
capitalists from competition with cheap goods, the Government
erected high-tariE barriers, setting substantial duties on imported goods.
Both these measures robbed the masses of the population.
It was the people who were fleeced to provide the money for the
subsidies granted the capitalists. And the protective tariff
obliged the people to overpay for every nail, for every yard
of cloth. At the close of the nineteenth century, sheet iron in
St. Petersburg sold at from 3 rubles 4 kopeks to 3 rubles as
kopeks a pood (about 35 Ibs.), while in London the price was
practically a third as much-I ruble 13 kopeks. For calico done
the working people of Russia overpaid more than ~w,ooo,ooo

rubles autruaIly!
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Despite government patronage, industry in R u s k did not
make s f i e n t progress to at& up with the equipment of
Western Europe. If was necessary to apply to foreign capital
again and again. And the foreign capitalists were only tm eager
to advance loans. They never dreamed that tsarism could b
swept away by a revolutim.
In order to get round the high tarifl barriers, French, English, German and Belgian capitalists began to build factories in
Russia it&£. Tsarism found itself in a vidous circle. To rid
itself of foreign dependence, large-de industries had beea set
up in Russia. But the capital required for this purpose came
from abroad, and this merely served to haease the dependence
on foreign cap;tal.
The Russo-Japanese War and particularly the rgog Revolution once again forced tsarism to its bees in supplication to
foreign capital. The Paris Stock E x c h a v t that time the
hub of international loan capitatto the aid of tsarism.
The French capitalists needed tsarism in its fight against the
Geman manufacturers, needed it to wring the interest on the
old Russian loans from the people, needed it to safeguard the
factories of the foreign capitalists in Russia, and most of all
needed it to crush the ~volution,sparks of which might kindle
a mighty conflagration across the Russian border as well.
Russia's state debt rose uncmtrollably. The new bans scarce
ly sufficed to cover the interest on the old.
Rallying from the effects of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese
War and crushing the Revolution on funds supplied by the
foreiga imperialists, tsarism became irrevmbly enmeshed in
the h n d s of foreign capital. A numkr of the principal
branches of industry were practically the mmopolies of foreign
capitalists. The Frmch and British controlled over p per cent
of the iron and steeI works in Russia, the Germans o m ro
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per cent. The iron and steel industry, locomotive aud railway
car c o n s t d m works, dint+building plants, the cod mining
and oil industries were almost entirely in the h d s of
f orcigners.
h r h g the World War, Russian dependence on foreign capital increased sharply. Tsarist Russia conducted the war on
funds supplied by the French and British imperialists. In three
yum the foreign debt tripled, rising from 4,5w,ooop gold
rubIes to the mormous sum of ~a,m,mo,oool By cutting
down or incrdng the credit they extended, the foreign imperialists could direct the p o l i i of tsarism as they c h
Russia became in essence a semkolony, of which the British
and French ambassadors felt themselves the uncrowned r u l w ~
Millions of workers and peasants of Russia perished for the
sake of the predatory interests of the foreign imperidists.
CountIess wofking people of Russia fell victim becaw of the
policy of the feudal landlords and the hrgaisie, which was
directed towards preserving the backwardness of the counhy
and its dependence on foreign capital.
The bourgeois-dcmocratic revolution in F e h a q , 1917,
- not effect any change. The change in gommment did not chm*
the imperialist nature of the war: under the bwrgeois h m i w
i d Government, as under the tsarist wvemment, the war'
rmtained a predatory one and was mntinued on the very same
enslaving loans from the foreign imperialists.
] '*

"From the viewpoint of world policy and i n m d
h m w capihl," wrote M n , "the Gwhkov-Mily&v government is simply a clerk in the baaking firm of 'Britain and
F m e , ' an instrument for the continuation of the impendkt
slaughter of the peoples." (V.I. L d n , Collected WwRs, Vol.
XXX,p. 315, Rum. 4.)

_

The entire courlre of the historid devekrpuent of Russian
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explains the wedmess and inexperience of the Russian bwrgeoisie. As the History of the Cm&
Parfy of tks S h t
Unim states :

I

"It had neither the experience of the French
example, in politid d i n a t i o n and politid
broad d e , nor the schooling of the British
broadly conceived crafty compromise." (OP.cit., p. ara.
Nor were the compromisers-the Sccialist-Revol11tioala
and Menshw-f
asaistance to the Russian bourgeoisie.
the course of many years of struggle, the Bolsheviks had ex
posed the Sodalist-Rwolutiotlaries and Mensheviks as agents o
the bourgeoisie. In the stormy months bf the Revolution o
99x7 tbe Bolshwiks had isolated these compromising agents o
the imperialist bourgeoisie by means of their far-reaching an
extensive agitational and propaganda work, with the mdt
the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Gwemment were left w l
out a support. Another reason for the celerity and s u c u s of
the socialist revolution was the fact that :

class as the working class of Russia, a class which had
steeled in battle, which had in a short space passed through
revolutions, and which by the w e of the third revoIution

The condition of the working class in old Russia was
tionally difficult. The exhausting working day averaging twel
md a half, and in the textile industry as much as fifteen. hou
sapped all energy. Unemployment w a s a constant threat to tb

vivals as existed in tsarist Russia. The d i c t a t d p of the
feudal landlord hindered the development of capitalism. The
working class of t w i s t Russia suffered doubly : bath because of
capitalism and bemuse of tbe insdcimt development of capitalism and the lack of all civic rights. Hence it was the working
class which, in its very 6 r s t actions, headed the revolutionary
movement of all democratic elements in town and country
against tsarism. Because of its determination and persistence
the working class succeeded in awakening and rousing all the
working people, all the peoples inhabiting the "prison of nations," as Lenin called tsarist Russia, for the struggle against
the autoeraq.
In one of his earliest works, Whaf thu '*Fries& of the
People" Are a d How They Fight Agaiwt the S o d - D e m o cm&, written as far back as 1894knin had foretold that "the
Russian worker, rising at the head of all the democratic eIemeats, will overthrow absolutism and lead the Russian proletariat (side by side with the proletariat of all countries) along
t h stmight road of open political struggle ta-dx
viet m b u c o a w ~ & tr m l w t i o ~ . " (V. I. X n , S e l e d ~ dWorks,
Vol. XI,p. 575.)
This brilliant forecast of the great leader of the working
people has been borne out. The proletariat prepared for its role
as leader in Iong years of struggle and mme out as the hegeman,
the acknowIedged Ieader of the masses.
The third reason for the victory of the revolution was that:

bL

"The working class of Russia had so effective an ally in the
revolution as the poor peasantry, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the peasant population." (History of the
Conrmureisf Partj) of the S&t
U&on, p. 2x3.)

The poor peasantry constituted 65 per cent of the population
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in old Russia Tens of millions of people lived in a state of
semi-stamation, The lack of land and the exorbitant
crushed the peasant poor, Over 6o,m,ow hectares of land
belonged to a mere 30,000 landlords, who forced the peasants
to work for them as in the epoch of serfdom.
From the very first days of the Party's existence, the Bolsheviks carried on an enormous amount of work mong the pmr
peasants. The masses of the peasantry realized that they could
win land, p a e and bread only under the leadership of the
Party of Lenin and Stalin.
"This served as a solid basis for the alliance of the proIetariat
and the poor peasantry. The existence of this alliance between
the working class and the poor peasantry determined the conduct of the middle peasants, who had long been vacillating and
only on the eve of the October uprising wholehWedly swung
over towards the revolution and joined forces with the poor
peasants." (Ibib.)
The October Socialist Revolution was a popular revolution,
The Bolsheviks won the masses away from the Socialist-Revolutiorwies and Mensheviks. The overwhelming majority of the
working people supported the proletariat, headed by the Bolshevik Party.
The international situation also did much to facilitate the via
tory of the great October Sodalist Revohtion. The entire imperialist world was split into two hostile m p s and was absorbed in the imperialist World War. Clutching at one another's
throats, neither the Anglo-French bloc nor the German bIoc
could render direct military aid to the Russian bourgeoisie. In
face of the devastating onslaught of the proletariat, which led
the masses of the working people after it, the Russian bourgeoisie was unable to hold out by itself. It was with good yeason that Lenin called the victorious and rapid spread of the
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act that it was beaded by so tried, militant and revolutionary a
party as the Bolshevik Party. Under the leadership of Lenin
and W i n , the Party succeeded in smashing the traitorous fol-

lowers of Trotsky and Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, rallying the proletariat around its banner. The Aexible and wise
of the Party convinced the work& p p l e of the correctinto the struggle.
"Only a party like the Bolshevik Party, caungous enough to
Iead the people in decisive attack, and mutious enough to steer
clear of all the submerged rocks in its path to the goal, only such
a party could so skillfully merge into one cornmvn revolutionary
torrent such diverse revolutianary movements as the general
democratic movement for peace, the peasant democratic movement for the seizure of the landed estates, the movement of the

tatorship of the pro let aria^" (lbid.)
lutions as weU, Most peoples had experienced revolutions before. A favorable balance of forces had accompied a nurnkr
of revolutions. But not one of these revolutions was I d by so
consistently revolutionary, so devoted and wise, so firmly welded
and flexible a party as the Bolshevik Party. The fact that it
was led by the Party of L a i n and Stalin was the principal
condition that in the final d y s i s determined the course and
outcome of the great h b e r Socialist Revolution, which was
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